More than two-and-a-half years after the drowning deaths of five FlyNYON passengers on a doors-off helicopter tour flight, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) still lacks an effective process for ensuring the safe use of supplemental restraints for open-door helicopter operations.

That was the conclusion of auditors from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the FAA’s parent agency, the U.S. Department of Transportation. On Dec. 8, they published a report titled “Weaknesses in FAA’s Supplemental Passenger Restraint System Authorization Process Hinders Improvements to Open-Door Helicopter Operations,” the result of an investigation announced in July of last year.

New York Senators Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand requested the audit in response to the March 11, 2018, accident in which a Liberty Helicopters Airbus AS350 B2, operated on behalf of FlyNYON, crashed into New York City’s East River. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the helicopter lost power after a tether connected to a supplemental harness on the front-seat passenger caught on and activated the aircraft’s floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever.

The pilot successfully entered an autorotative glide and deployed the aircraft’s emergency floats. However, the floats inflated only partially and asymmetrically, which led to the helicopter overturning within 11 seconds of hitting the water. While the pilot managed to escape the submerged cabin, all five passengers were tightly harnessed to the aircraft and unable to free themselves. They drowned before rescue divers could reach them.

Supplemental restraint systems are not required for doors-off operations, but are used by some operators to provide extra security against passengers falling out of the aircraft. In the immediate aftermath of the FlyNYON accident, the FAA issued an emergency order pertaining to doors-off flight operations for compensation or hire, prohibiting the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems that cannot be released quickly in an emergency.

By May 2018, the agency had developed a process by which operators can apply to FAA headquarters for permission to use supplemental restraints. Since then, the agency has issued 54 such letters of authorization to both operators and individuals.

Applicants are requested to provide detailed information about the harness system components they propose to use and a description of the planned operation, as well as a link to an eight-second video of an occupant demonstrating the harness system’s method of release. However, auditors found that the “FAA authorized applications without important information it needed to understand the risks of each restraint system or the operations in which it would be used.” Of the 54 applications approved, 18 did not list the specific aircraft in which the harness would be used, and 11 did not list the specific type of operation, the OIG report states.

Auditors also found that the FAA headquarters inspectors reviewing the applications did not have any specific technical background to evaluate the appropriateness of the certification standard used by the applicant. As a result, they approved some harness systems under non-aviation standards with components that would not be allowed under those standards.

“For example, FAA approved restraints under an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard, which certifies restraints that protect the user from falling during construction work,” says the OIG report. “This standard does not allow a body belt to be used as part of a fall arrest system. Yet, we found two instances where FAA authorized the use of a body belt under this OSHA standard.”

According to auditors, “FAA did not evaluate the appropriateness of a particular standard to an aviation environment,” instead relying on applicants to provide their opinions on which certification standard was appropriate for their open-door operation.

Moreover, because the FAA chose to centralize the approval process at its headquarters, local FAA inspectors were often left out of the loop altogether.

“In bypassing local inspection offices during both the review and authorization process, headquarters left inspectors unaware about whether the operators they were responsible for overseeing had requested or been authorized to use supplemental restraints,” the OIG report states. “Local inspectors need this information because these types of operations — specifically during open-door flights — likely pose a greater safety risk and could warrant enhanced surveillance.”

Those inspectors also lack adequate guidance for overseeing the use of authorized supplemental passenger restraints, the report adds. In a review of 3,448 inspection records for 13 helicopter companies conducting open-door operations, auditors found that only one FAA inspector documented that he verified the supplemental passenger restraint system in use was the same type identified in the FAA authorization. None of the FAA inspectors interviewed by auditors indicated that they had evaluated maintenance of supplemental restraints.

“Overall, FAA’s limited guidance may not ensure inspectors are overseeing operators’ safe use of the supplemental harnesses it has authorized,” the report concludes.

The OIG has made five recommendations to the FAA as a result of its investigation. At the top of the list is the recommendation that the FAA move forward with rulemaking to specifically address operations using supplemental passenger restraint systems. The FAA told the OIG it has initiated the rulemaking project and expects to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in February 2021.

Other recommendations that the FAA plans to implement by Oct. 31, 2021 include: requiring all supplemental passenger restraint system applications to be reviewed using a standardized evaluation checklist; revising authorization procedures so applicants are routed through local oversight offices; and developing and incorporating supplemental passenger restraint inspection criteria.

The OIG also wants the FAA to define minimum certification standards that meet aviation-specific load factors for supplemental passenger restraint systems. The FAA responded, however, that because these types of restraints are carry-on devices and not certified by the agency, it does not believe that minimum certification standards are appropriate for the submission process.

Not specifically addressed by the report or the FAA’s evaluation process is how quick-releasing supplemental passenger restraint systems might interfere with egress even when they function properly. That concern was raised last year at the NTSB’s public hearing for the Liberty Helicopters/FlyNYON crash, where board member Jennifer Homendy criticized the approval process’s lack of real-world testing.

“FAA looked at a seven-second video, and this helicopter inverted in 11 seconds,” she said. “How is it any safer that you now have a harness that you have to quick release, you have an FAA restraint — a seatbelt — that you have to quick release, and then you have to get over the headset, which we have said can possibly cause entanglement, and then get out, after no testing?”